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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargain 
Negotiations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to counsel. The 
Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence.”1 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel Clause to mean that criminal 
defendants have the right to “effective assistance of counsel.”2 In 
Strickland v. Washington,3 the Court held that the assistance 
provided to a criminal defendant is ineffective if (1) the counsel’s 
performance was “deficient” and (2) the deficient performance 
“prejudiced” the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial.4 If counsel’s assistance to a criminal defendant is ineffective, 
then the defendant’s conviction may be reversed or his sentence may 
be set aside.5 The Court later extended this right to effective 
assistance of counsel to state court defendants in Gideon v. 
Wainwright.6 
In Williams v. Jones,7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit considered a unique question: whether a defendant’s murder 
conviction should be reversed or his sentence set aside where his 
counsel’s assistance in plea bargain negotiations was deficient, 
notwithstanding his conviction following a fair trial. On appeal, the 
Tenth Circuit held that the defendant established both “deficient 
performance and prejudice.”8 Accordingly, the court remanded the 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added). 
 3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 4. Id. at 687. 
 5. Id. 
 6. 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that the right to the assistance of counsel is 
“fundamental and essential to a fair trial” and is thus “made obligatory upon the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (quotations omitted)). 
 7. 571 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 8. Id. at 1091. 
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case so the district court could determine the proper remedy for the 
constitutional violation.9 
The question presented in Williams has national significance and 
has vexed state and federal courts alike. Some courts presented with 
evidence of deficient counsel during plea bargain negotiations have 
found a constitutional violation; those courts, however, have 
struggled to define the proper remedy for the constitutional 
violation.10 Other courts simply have denied that a constitutional 
violation occurred where counsel’s performance was deficient during 
plea bargaining, so long as the defendant was afforded a subsequent 
fair trial.11 The Tenth Circuit in Williams grappled at length with the 
nature of the constitutional violation implicated by deficient attorney 
performance during plea negotiations. In the end, a divided panel 
held that a constitutional violation occurred. In remanding the case, 
however, the court was unable to set any meaningful guidelines for 
the lower court to utilize to determine a proper remedy.  
In 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hoffman v. 
Arave,12 a case similar to Williams, and asked the parties to brief the 
following question: “What, if any, remedy should be provided for 
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargain negotiations if 
the defendant was later convicted and sentenced pursuant to a fair 
trial?”13 Before deciding the case, however, the Supreme Court 
 
 9. Id. at 1093. 
 10. See, e.g., Williams v. Jones, No. CIV-03-201-RAW, 2006 WL 2662795, at *12 
(E.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2006) (affirming state court’s lowering of sentence for first-degree 
murder from life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole), rev’d, 571 F.3d at 1093 (10th Cir. 2009) (remanding the case with 
vague “instructions to the district court to entertain briefing and impose a remedy that comes 
as close as possible to remedying the constitutional violation”); Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 
487, 500 (7th Cir. 2007) (a court has discretion over whether to order a new trial or impose 
the terms of the original plea offer); Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 942–43 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(proper remedy is reinstatement of plea offer), vacated in part, 552 U.S. 117 (2008); Satterlee 
v. Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362, 370–71 n.7 (6th Cir. 2006) (defendant should be given an 
opportunity to accept reinstated plea offer); see also United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 
381–82 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (grant of new trial was an appropriate remedy); Jiminez v. 
Oklahoma, 144 P.3d 903, 907 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (sentence modified to conform to 
term in plea agreement). 
 11. See, e.g., Utah v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1191 (Utah 2007) (holding that a 
subsequent fair trial vitiates any Sixth Amendment violation). 
 12. 455 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 552 U.S. 1008 (2007), vacated as 
moot, 552 U.S. 117 (2008). 
 13. Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 1008, 1008 (2007) (granting Petitioner’s writ of 
certiorari). 
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dismissed it as moot on unrelated grounds (the defendant voluntarily 
asked that the ineffective assistance of counsel portion of his case be 
dismissed).14 Given the disagreement and uncertainty in the courts 
(and on the Tenth Circuit panel), the Supreme Court may conclude 
that Williams merits its review. 
Part II of this Note discusses the facts and procedural history of 
the Williams case, the defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder 
and his sentence to life in prison without parole, and his subsequent 
petitions for relief due to his attorney’s deficient performance during 
plea negotiations. Part III considers the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution’s Right to Counsel Clause. It 
argues that the Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Right to 
Counsel Clause reveal that the clause, and the Sixth Amendment as a 
whole, operates to provide fair trials for criminal defendants. Part IV 
analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Jones, as well as 
the dissenting opinion of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch. Specifically, it 
describes the panel majority’s lack of appreciation for the underlying 
purpose of the Counsel Clause—to ensure a fair trial. Part V provides 
brief conclusions to the analysis made in this Note. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the early morning hours of June 9, 1997, Michael Joe 
Williams entered the trailer home of Larry Durrett in Okmulgee, 
Oklahoma, fired five shots at Durrett, and killed him.15 After a trial, 
an Oklahoma jury convicted Williams of first-degree murder and 
sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.16 
Although the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Williams had committed first-degree murder, it is undisputed (even 
by Williams) that Williams’s counsel provided effective assistance 
during trial.17  
It also is undisputed, however, that the performance of 
Williams’s counsel during plea negotiations was deficient.18 Before 
 
 14. Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 117, 118 (2008) (“Because [Respondent’s] claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel during pretrial plea bargaining is moot, we vacate the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it addressed that claim.”). 
 15. Williams v. Jones, No. CIV-03-201-RAW, 2006 WL 2662795, at *1, *4 (E.D. 
Okla. Sept. 14, 2006). 
 16. Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 17. See id. at 1091 (“Mr. Williams subsequently received a fair trial . . . .”). 
 18. Id. 
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trial, state prosecutors offered Williams a ten-year sentence in 
exchange for pleading guilty to second-degree murder.19 Williams 
wanted to accept the offer, but his counsel insisted that Williams 
proceed to trial. Williams’s attorney believed so strongly that 
Williams should reject the plea offer and proceed to trial that he 
threatened to withdraw from the case if Williams accepted the plea 
offer.20 He even counseled Williams that a guilty plea would be 
tantamount to perjury.21 Williams followed the advice of his 
attorney, declined to accept the plea offer, and the case proceeded to 
trial. Ultimately, Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.22 
Williams appealed his conviction and sentence directly to the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), arguing that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. 
The OCCA immediately remanded the case to the state trial court 
for a determination whether Williams received ineffective assistance 
of counsel during plea negotiations. The state trial court concluded 
that the performance of Williams’s attorney during plea negotiations 
was deficient, satisfying the first prong of the Strickland test.23 Yet 
the trial court also determined that Williams suffered no prejudice. 
As a result, the trial court concluded that the Strickland test was not 
satisfied and that Williams’s conviction and sentence should not be 
disturbed.24  
Williams appealed the state court’s ruling. On appeal, the OCCA 
agreed that Williams’s attorney’s performance during plea 
negotiations was deficient.25 The OCCA held, however, that by 
following the (deficient) advice of his attorney, Williams and his 
defense were prejudiced “because he lost the opportunity to pursue 
the plea offer with trial counsel.”26 Accordingly, the OCCA 
determined that Williams had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. To remedy this 
constitutional violation, the OCCA modified Williams’s sentence to 
 
 19. Id. at 1088. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1091. 
 22. Id. at 1088. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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life imprisonment with the possibility of parole27—the lowest possible 
punishment for first-degree murder under Oklahoma law.28 
Williams then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, contending that 
the OCCA’s modification of his sentence did not adequately remedy 
the constitutional violation because it did not restore him to the 
position he would have been in had he accepted the plea offer. The 
court denied Williams’s petition on the ground that the modified 
sentence fell within the statutory sentencing range for first-degree 
murder in Oklahoma, and thus was inherently constitutional.29 
Williams appealed the district court’s decision to the Tenth Circuit. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel Clause guarantees 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”30 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this clause in numerous cases to 
provide robust protection to criminal defendants. 
A. Early Twentieth Century—The Supreme Court Gives Life to the 
Right to Counsel Clause 
In its early cases exploring a criminal defendant’s right to 
counsel, the Supreme Court established that a criminal defendant’s 
“defence” extends from arraignment to sentencing, that courts are 
without jurisdiction even to entertain a case when the defendant is 
not represented by counsel (unless he has waived that right), and 
that federal and state governments are obliged to pay for appointed 
counsel if the defendant cannot do so himself. 
In Johnson v. Zerbst,31 the Supreme Court held that 
representation by counsel is a prerequisite for a federal criminal 
trial—absent a criminal defendant’s “competent” and “intelligent” 
waiver of the right to counsel, a federal trial court lacks jurisdiction 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.9 (2002); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1066 
(2003). 
 29. Williams v. Jones, No. CIV-03-201-RAW, 2006 WL 2662795, at *12 (E.D. Okla. 
Sept. 14, 2006). 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 31. 304 U.S. 458 (1938), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477 (1981). 
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to try the case.32 Since the Sixth Amendment confers on criminal 
defendants the right to counsel, federal courts must comply with this 
constitutional mandate or they are without jurisdiction to entertain 
the case and, potentially, deprive the accused of his life or liberty. 
Conversely, when the right to counsel is knowingly waived, the 
assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court’s 
jurisdiction.33 
Zerbst firmly established the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in all federal criminal trials. But for many years the right to counsel 
in state prosecutions was determined exclusively by state law. In 
1932, the famous “Scottsboro Case” raised the question of whether 
a state’s failure to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in a capital 
case could deprive the defendants of their rights to due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Powell v. Alabama,34 the 
Court defined the scope of a criminal defendant’s “defence.” In that 
case, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause requires that criminal defendants—typically defendants that 
are more vulnerable to injustice—receive assistance of counsel from 
the time of arraignment all the way through trial.35 According to the 
Powell Court, criminal defendants are “as much entitled to . . . aid 
[before trial] as at the trial itself.”36  
In Powell, nine African-American men known as the “Scottsboro 
Boys” were accused of raping two young white women.37 All but one 
of the defendants were convicted and sentenced to death by all-white 
juries in a series of one-day trials in Alabama state court.38 The 
Supreme Court reversed the convictions. In relevant part, the Court 
held that the Scottsboro Boys (1) “were not given a fair, impartial, 
and deliberate trial”; (2) “were denied the right of counsel, with the 
accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation 
for trial”; and (3) were unfairly tried by juries comprised entirely of 
non–African Americans.39 In reversing the convictions, the Court 
 
 32.  Id. at 465. 
 33. Id. at 467–68. 
 34. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 35.  Id. at 57. 
 36. Id. at 57 (citing People ex rel. Burgess v. Riseley, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 186 (1883); 
Batchelor v. Indiana, 125 N.E. 773 (Ind. 1920)). 
 37.  Id. at 49.  
 38. Id. at 49–50. 
 39. Id. at 50. 
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held that the defendants “did not have the aid of counsel in any real 
sense” from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of 
trial, “although they were as much entitled to such aid during that 
period as at the trial itself.”40 The Court noted that the defendants 
possessed several characteristics—“ignorance and illiteracy”; 
“youth”; “circumstances of public hostility”; subjection to 
“imprisonment and . . . close surveillance . . . by the military forces”; 
inability to communicate easily with friends and families, who were 
all in other states; and, above all, being in “deadly peril of their 
lives”—all of which led inevitably to the conclusion that, in denying 
the defendants access to counsel from the time of arraignment all the 
way through trial, the state had inflicted “a clear denial of due 
process.”41 
Although the Powell Court determined Alabama violated the 
Scottsboro Boys’ due process rights by failing to appoint counsel, the 
Court did not require counsel in all state prosecutions. Ten years 
later, in fact, in Betts v. Brady42 the Court held explicitly that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate 
the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, and, therefore, did 
not create an automatic right to counsel.43 Instead, the Court 
endorsed a case-by-case inquiry into the fundamental fairness of a 
given proceeding, in light of the totality of the facts in that case.44 In 
Betts, the defendant’s conviction for robbery was affirmed even 
though the judge refused to appoint counsel upon request.45 The 
Court considered the circumstances of the case and concluded as 
follows: 
[T]he accused was not helpless, but was a man forty-three years 
old, of ordinary intelligence, and ability to take care of his own 
interests on the trial of that narrow issue [alibi defense]. He had 
once before been in a criminal court, pleaded guilty to larceny and 
served a sentence and was not wholly unfamiliar with criminal 
procedure. It is quite clear that in Maryland, if the situation had 
been otherwise and it had appeared that the petitioner was, for any 
 
 40. Id. at 57. 
 41. Id. at 71. 
 42. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 
(1963). 
 43. Id. at 461–62.  
 44. Id. at 471–72.  
 45. Id. at 472–73.  
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reason, at a serious disadvantage by reason of the lack of counsel, a 
refusal to appoint would have resulted in the reversal of a judgment 
of conviction.46 
After several Supreme Court cases weakened Betts’s central 
holding that states are not required by the Sixth Amendment to 
appoint effective counsel in all criminal trials,47 the Supreme Court 
overruled Betts in Gideon v. Wainwright,48 holding that the Sixth 
Amendment’s Right to Counsel Clause is “made obligatory upon 
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.”49 As such, the Court 
held, indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions in a state court 
have the right to have counsel appointed for them and paid for by 
the state.50 In Wainwright, the state court refused to appoint counsel 
because, by state custom, only defendants in capital cases were 
entitled to counsel appointed and paid for by the state.51 On appeal, 
the defendant challenged his conviction and sentence on the ground 
that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel effectively denied him 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.52 Having previously 
construed the Sixth Amendment to require federal courts to provide 
counsel for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right was 
competently and intelligently waived, the Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment imposed the same standard on the states: 
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is one of the 
“fundamental and essential”53 fair-trial rights “made obligatory upon 
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.”54 
Thus, after Wainwright, the Court had firmly established that 
the Sixth Amendment, through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, (1) requires that criminal defendants be 
provided with the assistance of counsel before trial in state and 
federal court, from arraignment all the way through to trial; (2) 
strips trial courts of jurisdiction unless the criminal defendant has had 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 846–47 (8th ed. 2007). 
 48. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 49. Id. at 340 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942)). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 337.  
 52. Id. at 339.  
 53. Id. at 344.  
 54. Id. at 342. 
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the assistance of counsel from the time of arraignment all the way 
through the trial; and (3) if the criminal defendant is unable to 
afford an attorney, requires the state to provide one for him. 
B. Strickland v. Washington and “Effective” Assistance of Counsel 
In the above-recited cases the Supreme Court recognized that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel protects the fundamental 
right to a fair trial. In McMann v. Richardson,55 the Supreme Court 
held that the right to counsel means the right to effective counsel.56 
The McMann Court, however, declined to provide a standard for 
determining whether a lawyer’s efforts constitute effective assistance, 
preferring to leave that determination “to the good sense and 
discretion of the trial courts . . . .”57 But the McMann Court did 
admonish that “if the right to counsel guaranteed by the 
Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the 
mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive to 
maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are 
representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.”58 
In Strickland v. Washington,59 the Supreme Court established the 
standard by which courts are to evaluate a convicted defendant’s 
claim that his counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require the 
reversal of his conviction or the setting aside of his sentence. “First, 
the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.”60 This is the deficiency prong of Strickland. “Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”61 This is the prejudice prong.  
To establish deficiency, the defendant must overcome “a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance,” and show that it was objectively 
unreasonable.62 Prejudice is normally established by showing that 
 
 55. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 56. Id. at 771 n.14 (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). 
 57. Id. at 771. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 60. Id. at 687. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 689. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
260 
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”63 “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”64  
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
There is a reasonable probability that Williams v. Jones will 
eventually find its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, given that the 
Supreme Court already has granted certiorari in a similar case posing 
the same constitutional question (although that case was dismissed as 
moot on unrelated grounds).65 Certiorari is merited in this case 
because the panel majority failed to grasp the underlying purpose of 
the Right to Counsel Clause—to provide for a fair trial with a just 
outcome. Although Williams received a harsher sentence than he 
would have received had he accepted the prosecutor’s plea offer 
because he followed the (deficient) advice of counsel, that does not 
mean that the outcome was unjust or unfair. To the contrary, 
Williams was afforded all that the Constitution requires—he was 
given a fair trial by an impartial jury with effective assistance from his 
trial counsel. The Sixth Amendment was not violated. 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision 
In a split decision, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Williams received ineffective 
assistance of counsel during plea bargain negotiations, in violation of 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.66 Specifically, the court held 
that Williams satisfied Strickland’s two-prong test because he showed 
deficient performance by his attorney at the plea bargain stage of the 
proceedings, and because he showed that his attorney’s deficient 
performance prejudiced him in the sense that but for the attorney’s 
errors, Williams would have been able to secure a more lenient 
sentence.67 
 
 63. Id. at 694. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
 66. Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 67. Id. at 1091. 
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The deficient performance, according to the court, was 
Williams’s counsel’s advice concerning the plea agreement—i.e., that 
Williams would be committing perjury by accepting the plea offer—
and his threat to withdraw from representing Williams if Williams 
accepted the plea agreement.68 In fact, all agreed that Williams’s 
attorney’s performance was deficient at the plea bargain stage of the 
proceedings. Even dissenting Judge Gorsuch acknowledged that 
Williams’s attorney acted in a deficient, albeit good faith, manner.69 
The Tenth Circuit also held that due to his attorney’s deficiency, 
Williams suffered prejudice, thus satisfying the second Strickland 
prong. According to the court, “the prejudice Mr. Williams 
identified was that, had he been adequately counseled, there is a 
reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer and 
limited his exposure to ten years.”70 The court thus squarely focused 
the prejudice inquiry on the prejudice to the outcome of the case for 
the particular defendant, not on the prejudice to the fairness of the 
actual trial eventually given to the defendant: “The fact that Mr. 
Williams subsequently received a fair trial (with a much greater 
sentence) simply does not vitiate the prejudice from the 
constitutional violation.”71 The court, without support, credited the 
OCCA’s conclusion that it is reasonably probable that Williams 
would have accepted the prosecution’s plea offer “but for defense 
counsel’s ineffective assistance.”72 “Accordingly,” the court stated, 
“we are not dealing with the government’s discretion to make or 
withdraw a plea offer. Rather, we are dealing with an offer that was 
rejected because of defense counsel’s ineffective assistance, with 
disastrous results for Mr. Williams.”73 Ultimately, Williams’s 
attorney’s deficient performance led directly to a higher sentence, 
prejudicing the outcome for Williams. 
The court touched only lightly on the “purpose” of Strickland—
to “protect[] the right to a fair trial”74—stating cursorily that fair 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1096 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Nor do I question the OCCA’s conclusion 
that Mr. Williams’s counsel performed deficiently in the plea negotiation process.”). 
 70. Id. at 1091 (majority opinion). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 1092 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 
(2006)). 
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trial considerations did not sway its conclusion. Instead, the court 
simply declined to adopt an approach “which would hold that a 
subsequent fair trial vitiates any Sixth Amendment violation.”75 
In contrast to the majority approach, dissenting Judge Neil M. 
Gorsuch focused primarily on the purpose of the Counsel Clause—
“to ensure a fair trial.”76 By all accounts—including Williams’s—
Williams received a fair trial. Thus, because “the due process clauses 
of the Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not 
encompass a right to receive or accept plea offers,” no constitutional 
violation occurred, even though, by professional standards, 
Williams’s attorney acted in a professionally deficient manner.77 “As 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, plea bargains are matters of 
executive discretion, not judicially enforceable entitlement; due 
process guarantees a fair trial, not a good bargain.”78 After analyzing 
the two prongs of the Strickland test, Judge Gorsuch concluded that 
Williams was not prejudiced because he received a fair trial; 
Williams’s counsel’s deficient performance at the plea bargain stage 
was unrelated to that proceeding. 
B. The Majority in Williams Failed to Fully Analyze the Purpose 
Underlying the Right to Counsel Clause and Strickland 
Any analysis of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel must begin with, and satisfy fully, Strickland. Strickland’s 
two-prong test is now very familiar, and the Tenth Circuit in 
Williams went to great lengths to squeeze the facts of Williams into 
the two prongs. The court failed, however, adequately to take into 
account the purpose underlying the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Strickland, and ultimately, the purpose underlying the Constitution’s 
Right to Counsel Clause. 
In giving meaning to the requirement [that a criminal defendant 
receive the effective assistance of counsel] we must take its 
purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide. The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
 
 75. Id. (citing Utah v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2007)). 
 76. Id. at 1094 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
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process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result.79 
The hallmark, then, of any analysis of the Right to Counsel 
Clause and any application of Strickland’s two-prong test, is whether 
(1) the defendant received a fair trial (2) that produced a just result. 
Misunderstanding the underlying purpose of Strickland’s test and 
the Right to Counsel Clause generally, the Tenth Circuit simply held 
that Williams was deprived of the best possible outcome and 
therefore had been deprived of his constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.80 
As discussed above,81 the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
Sixth Amendment exists, and is needed, in order to protect the 
fundamental right to a fair trial. “The Constitution guarantees a fair 
trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic 
elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the 
Sixth Amendment,”82 including guaranteeing that the accused 
receives “a speedy and public trial”; that the trial be conducted 
before “an impartial jury” comprised of persons previously selected 
from the defendant’s state and district; that the defendant “be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”; that the 
defendant be “confronted with the witnesses against him”; that the 
defendant be able to obtain witnesses by compulsion; and that the 
defendant “have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”83 
That the right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial 
system is well established by Supreme Court precedent.84 According 
to the Strickland Court, this is because “counsel’s skill and 
knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ‘ample opportunity 
to meet the case of the prosecution’ to which they are entitled.”85 
Nowhere in the Constitution is a criminal defendant given 
entitlement to a plea bargain. Rather, plea bargains represent merely 
a prosecutorial grace, a means to better manage the crushing 
workflow of the criminal justice system. 
 
 79. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
 80. Williams, 571 F.3d at 1088. 
 81. See supra Part III. 
 82. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85. 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 84. See supra Part III. 
 85. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (emphasis added) (quoting Adams v. United States ex 
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275–76 (1942)). 
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The Founders included the guarantee of the assistance of counsel 
in the Bill of Rights “because it envisions counsel’s playing a role 
that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just 
results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether 
retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that 
the trial is fair.”86 Given counsel’s central role in assuring a fair trial 
that results in a just outcome under the law, the Court has 
recognized the right not only to the assistance of counsel, but “‘the 
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’”87 
C. In Light of the “Fair Trial” and “Just Results” Purposes Underlying 
the Right to Counsel Clause, Strickland’s Two Prongs Are Not Satisfied 
in Williams 
As noted above, Strickland’s two prongs must be analyzed in 
light of the underlying purposes of the Right to Counsel Clause. 
While it is undisputed that Williams’s attorney performed deficiently 
during plea bargain negotiations, such action did not prejudice 
Williams’s ability to obtain a fair trial. Thus, Strickland is not met, 
and Williams’s conviction should stand. 
Under the first component in Strickland, a defendant must show 
that counsel’s performance was deficient. “This requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 
as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.”88 Admittedly, Williams’s attorney acted unreasonably 
in concluding that Williams was innocent and insisting that Williams 
reject the plea offer. Criminal defense attorneys obviously cannot 
take a client’s professed innocence at face value, especially in the 
absence of corroborating evidence. Moreover, Williams’s attorney 
acted egregiously when he persuaded Williams by telling him that he 
would be perjuring himself by pleading guilty. Surely Williams’s 
attorney could have examined the evidence, as the jury did, and 
concluded that a plea to second-degree murder might be the best 
choice for Williams. 
But satisfying Strickland’s first prong alone is insufficient to 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
 
 86. Id. at 687 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 686 (emphasis added) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
n.14 (1970)). 
 88. Id. at 687. 
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Amendment. In addition to deficient performance by counsel, a 
criminal defendant also must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. “This requires showing that counsel’s errors 
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable.”89 In no way did Williams’s attorney 
prejudice the actual, fair trial that occurred. In no way did the 
attorney’s performance produce a less reliable result. As the Court 
stated in Strickland, “[u]nless a defendant makes both showings, it 
cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in 
the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”90 
In reality, the majority in Williams conflated an unfortunate 
outcome for Williams with a constitutionally prejudiced outcome. 
Our society exacts certain punishments for certain crimes. After a fair 
trial where he was represented by able counsel, Williams was 
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. That 
result was not unjust; it was not unfair. Williams should not be 
constitutionally entitled to a do-over because he, on bad advice, 
chose not to take advantage of an opportunity he was not entitled to. 
D. The Practical Problems Arising From Williams 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Williams is untenable as a 
practical matter. The en banc dissenters in Arave v. Hoffman, the 
Ninth Circuit case for which the Supreme Court earlier granted 
certiorari to decide the issue faced by the Williams court, understood 
the practical problems posed by allowing a criminal defendant to 
decline a plea offer, take his case to trial and lose fairly, only to return 
to the courts seeking the original plea offer. Arave involved the 
rejection of a plea bargain that would have imposed life in prison 
instead of the death penalty upon a criminal defendant where the 
defendant heeded allegedly faulty advice by defense counsel. The 
Arave en banc dissenters91 argued that the original panel’s 
conclusion, that defense counsel’s recommendation was based upon 
incomplete research and “that his client risk[ed] much in exchange 
for very little,”92 
 
 89. Id. (emphases added). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Seven Ninth Circuit judges dissented en banc. See Hoffman v. Arave, 481 F.3d 686 
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 92. Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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open[s] this court up to a cavalcade of challenges. Every defendant 
whose attorney reasonably predicted a likely sentence which turned 
out to be wrong, or who erroneously predicted the direction of the 
court’s constitutional holdings, has a claim of deficient 
performance. And yet, how often does an attorney give advice that 
does not in some way predict future court action?93 
As Judge Gorsuch concisely explained it: “So long as a defendant 
can claim his lawyer mishandled a plea offer, he can take his chances 
at a fair trial and, if dissatisfied with the result, still demand and 
receive the benefit of the foregone plea.”94 Given that Williams 
received a fair trial and that his attorney competently conducted the 
trial, Williams should not be given the choice, after the fact, to opt 
back into the plea agreement—an offer that was originally given by 
the grace of the prosecutor, not as a constitutional right. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Williams v. Jones was wrongly 
decided because the majority failed to take into account the purpose 
underlying the Right to Counsel Clause. The bedrock right to the 
effective assistance of counsel does not exist to provide the best 
outcome for a criminal defendant. Rather, it is meant to ensure a fair 
trial that produces just results. Williams cannot say that his trial was 
unfair, or that the resulting verdict was unjust, merely because he 
failed to take advantage of a plea offer that in retrospect was too 
lenient—an offer to which Williams does not possess a constitutional 
right. Due to overwhelming evidence, Williams was convicted of 
first-degree murder. The law requires that he be punished 
accordingly, and that punishment should be allowed to stand. 
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